The 2026 budget of the U.S. Air Force reveals a challenging trade-off between the NGAD and CCA drones, which are central to a new air superiority doctrine.
In Summary
The notion of a retreat of the NGAD in American priorities is neither entirely true nor entirely false. It primarily signifies a turning point. At the outset of the initial budget allocations for 2026, the U.S. Air Force clearly questioned its ability to simultaneously fund a very costly sixth-generation fighter, CCA drones, nuclear modernization, the B-21, and the rest of its fleet. Frank Kendall acknowledged this afterwards: in the first draft of the budget, the NGAD was not financially viable. However, the trajectory changed in spring 2025 when Boeing was awarded the F-47 program, the name given to the crewed platform of the NGAD. The subsequent formalized budget version indeed maintained a massive effort on the NGAD while confirming a deeper truth: the USAF is now banking on a mixed architecture where the crewed aircraft is no longer the sole center of gravity. Therefore, the real shift does not oppose NGAD and CCA; it redefines their operational hierarchy.
The False Trial of an Abandoned NGAD
To present the 2026 budget as a near-condemnation of the NGAD would be an exaggeration. The official documents available indicate that the U.S. Air Force ultimately preserved the program. The Department of the Air Force published a budget request for FY2026 of $249.5 billion, of which $209.6 billion is allocated solely for the U.S. Air Force. Within this envelope, the official presentation states that $4.3 billion is dedicated to the development of the F-47 and the Collaborative Combat Aircraft. Later, when detailing the budget request, the Air Force specified an effort of about $807 million for the CCA and approximately $3.5 billion for the F-47. Therefore, the program has not vanished; it has been politically and budgetarily safeguarded.
What was actually questioned was its affordability, i.e., its financial sustainability over time. Frank Kendall publicly explained that, in the first version of the 2026 budget formulated before the change of administration, the Air Force felt it could not afford the NGAD. He even indicated that the program required tens of billions of dollars more over five years. In other words, the doubt did not concern the strategic utility of a sixth-generation fighter but rather its ability to survive within a budget saturated by other priorities. This is an important nuance that completely changes the interpretation of the file.
The Overwhelming Weight of Other U.S. Air Force Priorities
The NGAD does not operate in a budgetary void. The U.S. Air Force must simultaneously fund the ramp-up of the B-21 Raider, the modernization of two legs of the nuclear triad, the LRSO missile, the Sentinel program, the partial renewal of tankers, modernization of the F-35A, procurement of F-15EX, long-range munitions needs, and the refurbishment of an aging fleet. The official budget document also reminds us that the USAF’s RDT&E budget for 2026 reaches $46.4 billion, a very high level that reflects the accumulation of substantial programs to fund simultaneously.
This is where the debate becomes candid. The U.S. Air Force no longer has the flexibility it had in the 1990s. It must navigate between absolute quality and affordable mass. However, the NGAD has been designed to confront China in a highly contested environment, with requirements for stealth, range, connectivity, and survivability that mechanically drive up costs. Frank Kendall stated as early as 2022 that a piloted aircraft of this type could cost hundreds of millions of dollars per unit. At this level, the problem is no longer merely technical; it becomes structural. A fleet that is too small comprised of highly capable aircraft can lose the attrition war even before demonstrating its theoretical superiority.
The Doctrinal Shift Toward CCA
The decisive change is not only reflected in the amounts. It is evident in the doctrine. The Collaborative Combat Aircraft are no longer a marginal complement; they have become a pillar of the future American combat aviation. The USAF has confirmed a budget of $807 million for FY2026 to accelerate their development, support autonomy, and refine employment concepts. The service has already selected Anduril and General Atomics for Increment 1, with a clearly stated ambition: to have the first systems by the end of the decade.
The USAF’s reasoning is straightforward. A CCA is not meant to replace a crewed fighter in all aspects. Its role is to assist, absorb risk, extend fire volume, carry sensors, jam, serve as a scout, and even act as a decoy. The dual benefit is apparent. First, the drone enables the saturation of a defended airspace without immediately exposing a pilot. Second, it is much cheaper. Kendall mentioned a target cost of $25 to $30 million per unit for certain CCAs, roughly ten times less than the price of a new-generation crewed fighter. Even if this figure remains indicative, the scale is sufficient to understand the budgetary logic.
The New Equation Between Sophistication and Volume
The true priority of the USAF is not to choose between crewed aircraft and autonomous drones. It is to recalibrate the relationship between the two. For decades, American air power has rested on the idea that a small number of exceptional platforms could dominate a less advanced adversary. This logic remains valid against regional powers but becomes more fragile when facing China, which now combines volume, long-range missiles, electronic warfare, layered ground-air defenses, and modern combat aviation. In this context, a highly expensive crewed platform is no longer sufficient by itself; it must be at the heart of a distributed system.
The projected figures for the CCAs highlight the scale of the shift. The USAF has already mentioned an initial batch of 100 to 150 drones by 2029, in a vision of overall force potentially rising to 1,000 to 2,000 units. These magnitudes tell it all. Quantity is becoming central again. This is not a return to the past but a modern adaptation to high-intensity warfare. The United States is not renouncing sophistication; it is trying to make it sustainable through autonomous mass.
The NGAD as the Conductor Rather Than the Soloist
Nonetheless, the F-47 program retains a decisive role. The official announcement on March 21, 2025, should not be underestimated. By choosing Boeing for the Engineering and Manufacturing Development, the U.S. Air Force clearly indicated that it still desired a crewed sixth-generation fighter. Chief of Staff David Allvin emphasized a platform offering greater range, improved stealth, enhanced availability, and better adaptability than fifth-generation fighters. The stated goal is also to acquire 185 aircraft or more. We are not facing a mere political demonstrator; we are encountering a genuine ambition for the fleet.
However, the place of the NGAD has shifted. It is no longer conceived as the sole American response to future air superiority. It becomes the central node in a broader architecture. Its role is to penetrate as far as possible into the enemy’s bubble, survive within it, coordinate effects, and then delegate part of the risk and tactical load to less expensive vectors. This represents a profound transformation. In this logic, the crewed aircraft remains the brain but ceases to be the only armed arm.
The Signal Sent to the American Industry
The budgetary debate surrounding the NGAD also reveals much about the American industrial base. Boeing has secured an EMD contract worth over $20 billion to develop the F-47. For the aircraft manufacturer, weakened industrially and financially in other segments, this program represents a strategic rebuilding opportunity. For Washington, it is an industrial bet as much as a military one. However, this bet carries an opportunity cost. Every billion allocated to the NGAD is a billion that will not go to other priorities unless the overall envelope is significantly increased. This is precisely what has made the file so contentious.
The message sent to industry is, moreover, ambiguous. On one hand, the Pentagon confirms its desire for high-tech platforms. On the other hand, it strongly pushes toward cheaper, more quickly produced, and more readily renewable systems. This could favor new entrants, particularly in the fields of drones, autonomy, embedded software, and distributed sensors. The industrial center of gravity could thus partially shift from traditional prime contractors to a broader, more agile, and more digital ecosystem.
The Geopolitical Impact Facing China
This budgetary trade-off is not merely a financial squabble. It responds to a specific geopolitical constraint: the rise of China. The Department of the Air Force explicitly states that China is the structuring challenge informing its 2026 budget request. The problem posed by Beijing is not only qualitative; it is also quantitative. The United States recognizes that it cannot indefinitely maintain air combat capability that is too rare, too costly, and too difficult to regenerate in a prolonged conflict in the Indo-Pacific.
The increased reliance on CCAs directly addresses this challenge. In a vast theater, facing considerable distances, vulnerable bases, and the need to preserve missile stocks, autonomous drones offer valuable flexibility. They can be pre-positioned, consumed more easily than a crewed aircraft, deployed en masse, and integrated into swarm combat logic. This does not render the NGAD unnecessary. It prevents it from becoming a precious jewel, too rare to be genuinely decisive.
The Strategic Lesson of the 2026 Budget
The 2026 budget does not narrate the abandonment of the NGAD. It tells something more intriguing: the end of an illusion. This illusion was the belief that an extraordinarily high-performing crewed platform could, alone, absorb the challenges of aerial warfare against a peer adversary. The USAF has ultimately maintained the F-47, but at the same time validated another principle: future air superiority will depend on a balance between technological excellence and force density.
This is where the topic becomes exciting for Europeans, for China, and for all industry players in the sector. American air power is not renouncing technological supremacy. It is acknowledging that this apex, without a supporting architecture that is less costly, risks becoming financially untenable. The real turning point is not the erasure of the NGAD; it is its relative demotion as the sole solution. The future belongs less to the solitary fighter than to the human-machine partnership, and especially to the capacity to produce enough intelligent mass to sustain a prolonged war.
Sources
Department of the Air Force, Air Force President’s Budget Request FY26
Department of the Air Force, FY26 PB Rollout Brief
U.S. Air Force, Air Force Awards Contract for Next Generation Air Dominance Platform, F-47, March 21, 2025
U.S. Air Force, Statement by Chief of Staff Gen. David Allvin on the USAF NGAD Contract Award
War Department, Background Briefing on FY 2026 Defense Budget, June 26, 2025
Air & Space Forces Magazine, How the 2026 Budget Shapes the Future Air Force Fighter Fleet, June 26, 2025
Air & Space Forces Magazine, Former Air Force Secretary Didn’t Include NGAD in 2026 Budget
Defense News, Did the Trump administration move too quickly to commit to the F-47?, April 9, 2025
Defense News, General: 8% cuts ‘painful,’ but could bring fresh funds for Air Force, February 26, 2025
Defense One, State of the Air Force 2025
CSIS, Updating Augustine’s Law: Fighter Aircraft Cost Growth in the Age of AI and Autonomy
Aerospace America, 2026 will test U.S. Air Force’s bet on drone wingmen, January 14, 2026




